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European Union (EU) law is equally authentic in 24 language versions. While this 
multilingualism enhances legal certainty by enabling individuals to ascertain their 
rights and duties under EU law in their own language, it paradoxically also reduces 
legal certainty, as it entails that full trust may not be placed in any single language 
version of EU law. Indeed, according to the settled case law of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ), the true meaning of EU law is to be established by means of a 
purposive/systematic interpretation in the light of all language versions. On the basis 
of court practices in the Netherlands, this article explores if, and to what extent, 
national judges take into account the multilingual aspect of EU law. It is assessed in 
that regard whether current practices raise issues of legal certainty, in particular in 
case of diverging language versions. It is argued that, in contrast to apparent current 
practices, language comparison should be a default step in the interpretation and 
application of EU law, as otherwise discrepancies between language versions of EU 
law may remain unnoticed. Moreover, national courts should refer such discrepancies 
to the ECJ. Lastly, national courts should use their margin of appreciation to attenuate 
any adverse effects for individuals who acted on the basis of a diverging language 
version.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
European Union (EU) law is equally authentic in 24 language versions. While 
this multilingualism enhances legal certainty by enabling individuals to 
ascertain their rights and duties under EU law in their own language, it 
paradoxically also reduces legal certainty, as it entails that full trust may not 
be placed in any single language version of EU law. Indeed, according to the 
settled case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ),1 EU law must be 
interpreted in a uniform way and the true meaning of EU law is to be 
established by means of a purposive/systematic interpretation in the light of 
all language versions. In recent years, this method of interpretation has 
increasingly attracted scholarly attention.2 In this context, most authors 
                                                 
1 In this article, references to the ECJ are to the Court of Justice as part of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and therefore do not refer to the General 
Court or the CJEU as a whole. 
2 In the more distant past, legal issues linked to multilingualism received little 
attention (see Jacques Ziller, 'Multilingualism and its Consequences in European 
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focus their attention on the issue of legal certainty at EU level.3 Considerably 
less consideration has been given to the practices of national courts when 
                                                 
Union Law' in Hermann-Josef Blanke, Pedro Cruz Villalón, Tonio Klein and Jacques 
Ziller (eds), Common European Legal Thinking – Essays in Honour of Albrecht Weber 
(Springer 2015) 437-438; Anne Lise Kjær and Silvia Adamo, 'Linguistic Diversity and 
European Democracy' in Anne Lise Kjær and Silvia Adamo (eds), Linguistic Diversity 
and European Democracy (Ashgate 2011) 1); see on the issue of multilingual 
interpretation inter alia Cornelis J. W. Baaij, 'The Significance of Legal Translation 
for Legal Harmonization' in Cornelis J.W. Baaij (ed), The Role of Legal Translation in 
Legal Harmonization (Wolters Kluwer 2012) 1-24; Cornelis J.W. Baaij, 'Fifty Years of 
Multillingual Interpretation in the European Union' in Peter M. Tiersma and 
Lawrence M. Solan (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Language and Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 217-231; Joxerramon Bengoetxea Caballero, 'Multilingual and 
Multicultural Legal Reasoning: the European Court of Justice' in Kjær and Adamo (n 
2) 97-122; Mattias Derlén, Multilingual Interpretation of European Union Law (Wolters 
Kluwer 2009); Lucie Pacho Aljanati, The Court of Justice of the European Union's Case 
Law on Linguistic Divergences (2007-2013): Interpretation Criteria and Implications for the 
Translation of EU Legislation (PhD Thesis), Université de Genève, 2015, 
<https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:76529> accessed  9 August 2018; Barbara 
Pozzo, 'L'interpretazione della Corte del Lussemburgo del testo multilingue: una 
rassegna giurisprudenziale' in Elena Ioriatti Ferrari (ed), Interpretazione e traduzione del 
diritto (CEDAM 2008) 73-112; Karen McAuliffe, 'Language and Law in the European 
Union: the Multilingual Jurisprudence of the ECJ' in Tiersma and Solan (n 2) 200-216; 
Christoph Sobotta, 'Die Mehrsprachigkeit als Herausforderung und Chance bei der 
Auslegung des Unionsrechts' (2015) Zeitschrift für Europäische Rechtslinguistik, 
<http://www.zerl.uni-koeln.de/christoph-sobotta/2015/mehrsprachigkeit-
unionsrecht> accessed 9 August 2018. 
3 See inter alia Elina Paunio, Legal certainty in Multilingual EU law, Language discourse 
and Reasoning at the European Court of Justice (Ashgate 2013); Elina Paunio, 'Beyond 
Predictability – Reflections on Legal Certainty and the Discourse Theory of Law in 
the EU Legal Order' (2009) 10 German Law Journal 1469-1493; Susan Šarčević, 
'Multilingual Lawmaking and Legal (Un)Certainty in the European Union' (2013) 
International Journal of Law, Language and Discourse 1-29; Theodor Schilling, 
'Beyond Multilingualism: on Different Approaches to the Handling of Diverging 
Language Versions of a Community law' (2010) European Law Journal 47-66; Jérémie 
Van Meerbeeck, 'The Principle of Legal certainty in the Case Law of the European 
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dealing with multilingual issues. As Bobek aptly remarks, this topic has 
largely remained 'beyond the textbooks'.4 Yet, as national courts play a 
pivotal role in the interpretation and application of EU law, the methods they 
use seem well worth investigating in all EU Member States. In that regard, 
the most comprehensive scholarly study is that of Derlén who has assessed 
the issue in Denmark, England and Germany.5 This paper supplements the 
available data by examining current court practices in the Netherlands. The 
purpose of this paper is, however, broader. In Section II, the current state of 
affairs regarding the interpretation of multilingual EU law will be discussed 
on the basis of case law of the ECJ. In Section III, current practices in 
national courts with regard to multilingual interpretation will be explored. In 
Section IV, the paper focuses on points of concern in current practices, such 
as the extent to which linguistic discrepancies may remain unnoticed by 
national judges and whether issues which are detected are, as a general rule, 
referred to the ECJ by means of a request for a preliminary ruling. Another 
point of concern is the possible lack of predictability and foreseeability of 
multilingual norms (in case of discrepancies between language versions). 
Section V explores how the rights of individuals could be enhanced in that 
regard. It will be argued that national courts should use their margin of 
appreciation to attenuate any adverse effects which may arise for individuals 
                                                 
Court of Justice: From Certainty to Trust' (2016) European Current Law (Yearbook) 
137-148.  
4 Michal Bobek, 'The Multilingualism of the European Union Law in the National 
Courts: Beyond the Textbooks' in Kjær and Adamo (n 2) 123-142. 
5 Derlén (n 2) discusses a total of 186 cases in which one or more foreign language 
versions have been used in the countries at issue. As to the United Kingdom, it is 
important to note that his survey is limited to England; see also Mattias Derlén, 'In 
Defence of (Limited) Multilingualism: Problems and Possibilities of the Multilingual 
Interpretation of European Union law in National Courts' in Kjær and Adamo (n 2) 
143-166; Mattias Derlén, 'A Single Text or a Single Meaning: Multilingual 
Interpretation of EU legislation and CJEU Case Law in National Courts' in Susan 
Šarčević (ed), Language and Culture in EU law: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Ashgate 
2015) 53-72. 
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who acted, in good faith, on the basis of a diverging language version of EU 
law. 
II. INTERPRETATION OF MULTILINGUAL EU LAW: THE STATUS 
QUAESTIONIS 
1. Discrepancies between Language Versions 
EU primary law is equally authentic in 24 languages.6 According to ECJ case 
law,7 the same is true of EU secondary law.8 Equal authenticity, a safeguard 
for legal certainty as it enables the addressees of the law to ascertain their 
rights and duties in their own language, may, however, rather paradoxically, 
also lead to interpretation disputes in case of alleged or real linguistic 
discrepancies between the language versions. In EU law, various scenarios 
may be discerned in this regard: discrepancies may occur between various 
versions of primary or secondary law, as well as, in the case of directives, 
                                                 
6 Art 55 Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and art 358 Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU). 
7 ECJ, case 283/81 CILFIT, EU:C:1982:335, para 18. It should be noted that Regulation 
1/1958, which lays down the language regime of EU institutions, stipulates in its article 
4 that regulations and other documents of general application must be drafted in the 
EU official languages. It does, however, not explicitly grant equal authenticity to the 
language versions of secondary EU law (Council Regulation No 1/1958 determining 
the languages to be used by the European Economic Community, OJ English special 
edition: Series I Volume 1952-1958, 59 (lastly amended by Council Regulation (EU) 
No 517/2013 of 13 May 2013, OJ L 158/1)). 
8 Irish, a Treaty language since the accession of Ireland in 1973, became an EU official 
language only in 2005. However, a transitional derogation is in force (until 2022): only 
regulations adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council are 
translated in Irish (Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2264 of 3 December 2015 
extending and phasing out the temporary derogation measures (…) introduced by 
Regulation (EC) No 920/2005, OJ L 322/1). A similar transitional derogation applied 
to the Maltese language until 1 May 2007 (Council Regulation (EC) No 930/2004 of 
1 May 2004 on temporary derogation measures relating to the drafting in Maltese of 
the acts of the institutions of the European Union, OJ L 169/1). 
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between a language version of a directive and the norm transposing into 
national law that directive in the same language.  
Such discrepancies may be either textual or conceptual.9 Textual divergences 
include legislative drafting issues10 or, in the case of multilingual EU law, 
translation errors, which may give rise to structural-grammatical differences 
(punctuation, conjunctions, omissions or additions, etc.).11 Conceptual or 
semantic divergences, on the other hand, concern the use of terms. For 
example, one language version might contain a polysemous term or a term 
with a more restrictive meaning or there may be a lack of consistency in the 
use of terms (e.g. different terms are used in one language version whereas in 
other languages one and the same term covers the concept at issue).12 In a 
more general way, these forms of conceptual indeterminacy in a given 
language may be described as 'vagueness', or 'ambiguity'.13 The conceptual 
incongruity may be the result of legislative or translation errors, but may also 
simply be unavoidable in multilingual law, namely where there is a lack of 
equivalence between corresponding legal concepts in different legal 
systems.14 Furthermore, seemingly identical concepts may be incongruous 
not only between different national legal cultures, but also between national 
law and EU law.15 
                                                 
9 See, in that regard, Pacho (n 2) 124, 136, 236 et seq. 
10 Lawrence Solan, 'Linguistic Issues in Statutory Interpretation' in Tiersma and Solan 
(n 2) 96 et seq. 
11 Pacho (n 2) 124, 136, 236 et seq; Aleksander Peczenik, On Law and Reason (Kluwer 
Academic Publishers 1989) 24. 
12 Pacho, (n 2) 124, 136, 236 et seq. 
13 An expression is ambiguous if it has multiple meanings (e.g. a bank may be a river bank 
or a commercial bank). It is vague if the definition of the concept itself is not clear 
(e.g. what are 'undue' conditions?). See Peczenik (n 11) 21 and Ralf Poscher, 
'Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation' in Tiersma and Solan (n 2) 129.  
14 Susan Šarčević, 'Challenges to the Legal Translator' in Tiersma and Solan (n 2) 194; 
Baaij (n 2) 225. 
15 Joël Rideau, 'Justice et langues dans l'Union européenne' in Cristina Mauro and 
Francesca Ruggieri (eds), Droit pénal, langue et Union européenne (Bruylant 2013) 41; 
Esther van Schagen, 'More Consistency and Legal Certainty in the Private Law 
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2. Case Law of the ECJ 
There is extensive case law of the ECJ on the issue of linguistic discrepancies 
between language versions of EU law.16  The Court first established its 
position half a century ago, when it was asked for the first time to rule on this 
issue.17 Since then, the ECJ uses a more or less standardized formula whenever 
a linguistic discrepancy arises and consistently recalls that 'provisions of EU 
law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions 
existing in all the languages of the European Union. Where there is 
divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, 
the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the general 
scheme and the purpose of the rules of which it forms part'.18 In addition, in 
                                                 
Acquis: a Plea for Better Justification for the Harmonization of Private Law' (2012) 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 56. See also ECJ, case 283/81 
CILFIT, EU:C:1982:335, para 19: 'It must also be borne in mind that even where the 
different language versions are entirely in accord with one another, Community law 
uses terminology which is peculiar to it. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that 
legal concepts do not necessarily have the same meaning in Community law and in 
the law of the various Member States.' 
16 See the following footnotes, in particular n 18. For overviews of case law, see Baaij (n 
2) 221 et seq; Bengoetxea Caballero (n 2) 97-122; Derlén (n 2) 43 et seq; Mc Auliffe (n 2) 
200-216; Pacho (n 2) 136 et seq; Pozzo (n 2) 73-112; Šarčević (n 3) 13; Schilling (n 3) 55 et 
seq; Stefaan van der Jeught, EU Language Law (Europa Law Publishing 2015) 127 et 
seq.  
17 ECJ, case 19/67 Van der Vecht EU:C:1967:49, 354. 
18 Eg ex pluribus ECJ, case 29/26 Erich Stauder v City of Ulm, Sozialamt 
ECLI:EU:C:1969:57, para 3; ECJ, case 30/77 Regina v Pierre Bouchereau, 
ECLI:EU:C:1977:172, para 14; ECJ, case 283/81 CILFIT  EU:C:1982:335, para 18; ECJ, 
case C‑404/16 Lombard Ingatlan Lízing EU:C:2017:759, para 21; ECJ, case C-48/16  
ERGO Poist'ovňa EU:C:2017:377, para 37; ECJ, joined cases C-443/14, Ibrahim Alo and 
C‑444/14, Amira Osso EU:C:2016:127, para 27; ECJ, case C-74/13 GSV EU:C:2014:243, 
para 27; ECJ, case C-558/11 Kurcums Metal EU:C:2012:721, para 48. Baaij has identified 
a total of 30 judgments in the ECJ case law in which this stock phrase is used (Baaij (n 
2), 218). 
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its landmark CILFIT judgment, the ECJ made it clear that this obligation 
also extends to national courts when applying and interpreting EU law.19 
The standard formula seems to give the ECJ quite some leeway to assess cases 
of discrepancy in order to find adequate solutions and provide for a uniform 
interpretation of all the language versions. To achieve that aim, the ECJ may 
use a literal interpretation method (comparing and reconciling the wording 
of different language versions) or a teleological-systematic method (reasoning 
based on the general scheme and the purpose of the rules at issue).20 One 
method does not exclude the other: both may be combined in one and the 
same interpretation process for a given provision.21 According to Baaij, the 
literal method is the prevailing one, in particular in case of translation 
errors.22 Moreover, when using the literal method, the ECJ may base its 
interpretation on the 'majority of languages' or, on the contrary, refer to the 
'clarity' argument, i.e. favour an interpretation on the basis of one or more 
clear language versions.23 On the other hand, the ECJ does not generally 
compare all language versions, at least not explicitly.24 Although the ECJ does 
sometimes implicitly refer to all the language versions of the provision(s) at 
issue,25 the most commonly used technique is, in current practice, that of a 
limited linguistic comparison whereby the provisions in the language of the 
case (which have given rise to the linguistic issue in the first place) are 
                                                 
19 ECJ, case 283/81 CILFIT EU:C:1982:335, para 18. 
20 See Pacho (n 2) 326; Derlén (n 2) 43 et seq. 
21 Solan argues, as to court practices in the US, that the categorical disagreement 
between purposive and literal interpretation is more a matter of degree. According to 
him, it's all about 'balancing the language, intent and broader goals of the legislation 
to produce an interpretation that is simultaneously as faithful as possible to all three 
considerations' (Lawrence Solan, 'Linguistic Issues in Statutory Interpretation' in 
Tiersma and Solan (n 2) 87-88). 
22 Baaij (n 2) 221, 229. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Sobotta (n 2) 18. It may be that a more extensive comparison is performed in internal 
discussions, see Rideau (n 15) 41.  
25 Eg ECJ, case C-168/14 Grupo Itelevesa EU:C:2015:685, para 42.  
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compared with a number of other language versions of the same provisions.26 
In practice, these reference languages are most often widely-known 
languages.27 Other languages are sometimes included in the comparison, but 
there is no clear predictable pattern.28 
Furthermore, in some of its case law as well as in the standardized formula 
used when dealing with linguistic discrepancies, in particular the phrase 
'[w]here there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU 
legislative text', the ECJ seems to suggest that the duty to consult other 
language versions of EU law is limited to cases in which there are reasons to 
question the accuracy of one language version.29 In the same vein, an 
assessment of the ECJ case law by Baaij seems to indicate that language 
comparison is not necessarily a default step in the ECJ's own interpretation 
process, thus suggesting that it compares languages only when in doubt.30 The 
                                                 
26 Eg ECJ, cases C-52/13 Posteshop EU:C:2014:150 para 20; C-46/15 Ambisig 
EU:C:2016:530, para 47; C‑74/13 GSV EU:C:2014:243, para 28. 
27 In a reference period from 1.1.2012 to 31.12.2017, 13 judgments were identified, in 
which a linguistic comparison was performed (search on published judgments in that 
period, using the search term 'version linguistique', by means of the search form on the 
website CURIA: <www.curia.europa.eu> (accessed 2.12.2018). In all cases (13), the 
French version was referred to. As to the other languages, explicit references were 
found to English (7), German (6), Spanish (5), Italian (4), and Portuguese (4). It should 
be taken into account that French is the internal working language of the ECJ (Karen 
Mc Auliffe, 'Language and Law in the European Union: The Multilingual 
Jurisprudence of the ECJ' in Tiersma and Solan (n 2) 203; Rideau (n 15) 33-34; Van der 
Jeught (n 16) 188 et seq.). 
28 In the period included in the search, Danish (3), Bulgarian (2), Finnish (2), Swedish (2), 
Polish (2), Estonian (1), Dutch (1), Romanian (1), Czech (1) and Hungarian (1) were also 
mentioned. See, ex pluribus, how languages are checked without clear criteria: ECJ, 
case C-65/14 Rosselle EU:C:2015:339, para 38. 
29 See e.g. ECJ, cases 19/67 Van der Vecht EU:C:1967:49, 354; C-64/95 Konservenfabrik 
Lubella, EU:C:1996:388, para 17; C‑640/15 Vilkas, EU:C:2017:39, para 47; C‑559/15 
Onix Asigurari, EU:C:2017:316, para 39. 
30 According to Baaij the ECJ included a comparison of language versions in the 
argumentation of 246 of its judgments (1960-2010). In 170 judgments thereof, the 
ECJ observed discrepancies between language versions. He asserts that a language 
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ECJ has, however, never explained the extent or the practical application of 
this 'criterion of doubt'.31 On the other hand, other ECJ case law seems to 
indicate that it is mandatory in all instances to compare the various language 
versions of EU law, irrespective of whether the language version in question 
is clear and unambiguous.32 At any rate, it is often only when language versions 
are compared that divergences are brought to light.  
Finally, it follows from the literal or teleological-systematic interpretation 
methods used by the ECJ in case of linguistic discrepancies between language 
versions that, first, the uniform interpretation of a given provision of EU law 
may contradict the clear meaning of that norm in one or more languages33 and 
that, second, national judges or individuals can therefore not rely solely on a 
single language version of EU law read in isolation.34 
III. CURRENT PRACTICES IN NATIONAL COURTS 
As was already stated in the introduction, the available research on the 
current practices of national courts is rather limited. In this section, 
reference will mainly be made to Derlén's empirical findings on Denmark, 
England and Germany. This will be supplemented and compared with my 
own research on Dutch case law.35 
                                                 
comparison was thus explicitly performed in only 3 % of all the ECJ judgments 
between 1960-2010) (Baaij (n 2) 219). Pacho, however, asserts that linguistic 
comparison is widely used as a method to support interpretation by the ECJ even 
when no divergences are present. According to her, such comparison takes place in 
31% of the cases which she assessed (Pacho (n 2) 227, 234). 
31 Tamara Ćapeta, 'Multilingual Law and Judicial Interpretation in the EU (2009) 
Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 9. 
32 Eg ECJ, cases C-498/03 Kingscrest EU:C:2005:322, paras 21-27; C-219/95P Ferriere Nord 
EU:C:1997:375, para 15. 
33  Šarčević (n 3) 16; Schilling (n 3) 55. 
34 Paunio (n 3) 44. 
35 <www.rechtspraak.nl> (official website where Dutch case law is published). The 
research was carried out on 21.6.2017. It concerns the period from the beginning of 
the EEC (1.1.1958) until 21.06.2017. The research included judgments of the Hoge 
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In case of linguistic discrepancies in EU law, national courts may (or have to, 
in certain cases) seek guidance from the ECJ by means of a request for a 
preliminary ruling on the basis of article 267 TFEU. Though it is difficult to 
assess whether, and to what extent, national courts do actually refer questions 
to the ECJ on linguistic issues or whether they tend to resolve such issues 
themselves, some evidence seems to point to the latter.  
First, the number of preliminary referrals from national courts to the ECJ 
regarding linguistic discrepancies in EU law is quite limited. According to 
Baaij, it is therefore unlikely that all cases involving language discrepancies 
before national courts made their way to the ECJ.36 He demonstrates that 
discrepancies between language versions (from 1960 to 2010) gave rise to 170 
judgments in which the ECJ acknowledged the existence of linguistic 
discrepancies. In 110 of these, discrepancies gave rise to interpretation 
problems. In the same vein, my own more limited survey shows that between 
01.01.2011 and 01.12.2018, 42 cases involving discrepancies between language 
versions of regulations or directives have arisen before the ECJ (6 of these 
cases concerned furthermore the same linguistic issue in a given directive). 
Issues were usually raised in direct actions; only 10 cases concern requests for 
preliminary rulings. 
Second, such language issues are only referred to the ECJ by courts from a 
limited number of Member States, mainly Germany, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and Lithuania.37  
Third, even in these Member States, it is unlikely that all linguistic issues are 
referred to the ECJ. Derlén notes the reluctance of Danish and English judges 
to refer questions of this sort to the ECJ.38 As concerns German case law, he 
cites judgments of the federal constitutional court upholding the judgments 
                                                 
Raad, the Raad van State, the Centrale Raad van Beroep, the College van Beroep voor het 
bedrijfsleven, as well as other courts and tribunals (Gerechtshoven/rechtbanken) in all 
areas of law. The search term used was taalversie (language version).  
36 Baaij (n 2) 15-16. 
37 Ćapeta (n 31) 10. 
38 Derlén (n 2) 79 et seq; (n 4) 106-117. 
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of lower courts where no language comparison was performed and no 
question had been submitted to the ECJ.39 Similarly, Dutch case law related 
to this issue suggests that there is no automatic referral to the ECJ and that 
in most cases courts deal with discrepancies themselves.40  
Also, the available research seems to suggest that, in current practice, 
national judges do not habitually perform a language comparison when 
interpreting and applying EU law. It would seem that, as a general rule, they 
compare language versions of EU law only in cases in which an initial 
suspicion of a linguistic issue in their own language is raised.41 This is the case 
when their own language version is unclear or ambiguous or when there is 
reason to believe that it does not accurately reflect the real intention of EU 
law makers (for instance in case of internal contradictions or incompatibility 
with a superior norm or when there are blatant translation errors or 
omissions).42 My own research concerning case law in the Netherlands seems 
to confirm this assumption: no cases were found in which language 
comparison was an automatic step in the interpretation process. Bobek 
suggests that doubts about their own language version are often raised by the 
parties.43 Similarly, Derlén reports cases in which lawyers submit their own 
(unofficial) translations of EU secondary law, established on the basis of other 
authentic language versions, to dispute the language version in the 
proceedings before the national court.44 Lawyers may indeed follow a 
language strategy when other languages offer more possibilities, even when 
their own language is perfectly clear and unambiguous.45 
Arguably, a general duty to compare their own language version of EU law 
with other versions in all cases would place a heavy burden on national courts 
in terms of time and resources. In current practice, however, it is not unlikely 
                                                 
39 Derlén (n 2) 87-92. 
40 See infra. 
41 Derlén (n 2) 119 et seq; 172 et seq. 
42 See, in this sense, Derlén (n 5) 153; Schilling (n 3) 61. 
43 Bobek (n 4) 136. 
44 Derlén (n 5) 154-155. 
45 Ćapeta (n 31) 11. 
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that a number of language discrepancies remain unnoticed before national 
courts. Indeed, as language comparison is not a default step in the 
interpretation process and as it may be assumed that national courts 
primarily, if not exclusively, use their own language version of EU law, they 
may not be aware of any linguistic discrepancies.46 Incidentally, it may also be 
that national judges simply do not have the necessary language skills to 
perform a multilingual interpretation. Interestingly, Derlén observes that, in 
a majority of cases, those judges performing multilingual interpretation did 
not explain the method they used to that effect (ranging from dictionaries to 
translations and comments by legal and language experts).47 It should also be 
noted in that respect that even at the ECJ, which can draw on a translation 
service and multilingual legal staff, language divergences are not always easily 
discerned.48 As a general rule, the issue is raised by the parties (in direct 
actions) or the national courts referring the case for a preliminary ruling (most 
probably also on the request of the parties themselves).49 For national courts, 
which do not have the same resources at their disposal as the ECJ, it is much 
more difficult to detect linguistic discrepancies and deal with them.  
Significantly in this regard, Dutch case law shows an increasing trend in the 
number of linguistic issues with regard to EU law. Out of a relatively small 
total number of cases which gave rise to linguistic discrepancies with regard 
to EU law (84) in the reference period, only 20 date from before 2011; the 
                                                 
46 Emilia Mišćenić, 'Legal Translation vs. Legal Certainty in EU Law' in Emilia 
Mišćenić and Aurélien Raccah (eds), Legal Risks in EU Law (Springer 2016) 94, 96. See 
also Ziller (n 2) 447. 
47 Derlén (n 2) 293. 
48 Schilling (n 3), 59; Sobotta (n 2) 28-29; Ćapeta (n 31) 10-11. Language discrepancies may 
in particular be discovered when those working on the case at the ECJ have 
proficiency in various languages: their mother tongue, French (the internal working 
language of the ECJ), as well as the language of the case. The probability of such a 
multilingual setting is particularly high in some Advocate General's chambers 
(Advocate Generals draft their Opinions in several languages, in principle in French, 
English, German, Italian or Spanish). Likewise, translation of procedural documents 
as well as judgments and opinions may reveal language discrepancies. 
49 Bengoetxea Caballero (n 2) 97; Sobotta (n 2) 28-29; Ćapeta (n 31) 10. 
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remaining 64 cases are from after that year.50 This increase is, however, not 
reflected in the number of referrals to the ECJ, which may suggest that 
linguistic discrepancies could remain to some extent undetected.  
Another factor worth mentioning is criticism voiced in legal scholarship 
concerning incoherent terminology in EU law, in particular with regard to 
private law.51 It is asserted that many terms are translated differently and 
interpreted in quite different ways according to the various legal contexts in 
which they are used, as there are no general definitions of these concepts in 
EU law.52 As Ioriatti-Ferrari aptly notes, EU law is essentially drafted by 
sector-specific experts or translators, who do not necessarily have legal 
training, and is only at the final stage revised by legal experts. She argues that 
this 'law without lawyers' may work well for technical topics but is more 
problematic in private law, as EU law does not necessarily use the 
terminology of the various national legal cultures.53 Furthermore, judges may 
                                                 
50 See n 35. 
51 Baaij (n 2) 7; Barbara Pozzo, 'Multilingualism, Legal Terminology and the Problems 
of Harmonising European Private Law' in Barbara Pozzo and Valentina Jacometti 
(eds), Multilingualism and the Harmonisation of European Law (Kluwer Law 
International 2006) 13. As Šarčević observes, 'the link between language, law and 
cultural identity is traditionally the strongest in private law' (Susan Šarčević, 'Creating 
a pan-European legal language' in Maurizio Gotti and Collin Williams (eds), Legal 
Discourse across Languages and Cultures (Lang 2010) 23. 
52 Ioriatti Ferrari (n 2) 149; Van Schagen (n 15) 37-62; Šarčević (n 51) 28 et seq. At the 
request of the European Commission experts have drafted a Common Frame of 
Reference to define inter alia fundamental concepts of private law (Christian von Bar, 
Eric Clive, Hans Schulte-Nölke, Hugh Beale, Johnny Herre, Jérôme Huet, Peter 
Schlechtriem, Matthias Storme, Stephen Swann, Paul Varul, Anna Veneziano and 
Fryderyk Zoll (eds.), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, 
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), prepared by the Study Group on a European 
Civil Code and the European Research Group on Existing EC Private Law (Acquis Group) 
(2009) available at <https://www.law.kuleuven.be/personal/mstorme/DCFR.html> 
accessed 2 December 2018. 
53 'Diritto senza giurista' (Ioriatti Ferrari (n 2) 85). 
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be unaware of conceptual divergences in meaning between language versions 
and simply apply the concepts they know from their legal culture. 
If a language comparison takes place, which languages are compared? 
Obviously, the idea of comparing all language versions, difficult even for the 
ECJ, seems completely unrealistic for national judges. Derlén did not identify 
a single case in which judges in his survey of Denmark, England and Germany 
consulted all language versions of EU law.54 Rather, Derlén suggests that, in 
current practice, national judges compare (in case of doubt) their own 
language version with a limited number of other languages, predominantly (in 
75% of cases) English and French.55 Dutch case law seems to corroborate 
these findings as to the limited number of reference languages used, yet 
suggests an even stronger position of English, while German precedes 
French, albeit by a narrow margin.56 At any rate, English is the default 
language with which the Dutch version of EU law is compared in all cases 
where linguistic issues arise (with the exception of two cases in which only 
German was used), while in about half of the cases there is an additional 
comparison with German and/or French.57 Similarly, Bobek observes that in 
Central Europe (the Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland and Hungary), the 
first reference languages would be 'either English or German'.58 Besides these 
widely-known languages, other languages may of course also be used. Bobek 
                                                 
54 Derlén (n 2) 288 et seq.  
55 Ibid.  
56 The difference as to the position of French in the research by Derlén could be 
explained by the fact that, as the author states, French is the best know foreign 
language to most English judges. Another element in favour of French is that many 
cases concern customs classifications (Combined Nomenclature) where French 
(together with English) has special significance. The use of German by Danish judges 
lags far behind English and French (Derlén (n 2) 289 et seq). 
57 See n 35. On a total number of 84 cases involving language discrepancies, the following 
references were found: English (84), German (44), French (43), Spanish (4), Italian (3), 
Danish (2), Finnish (1), Swedish (1). Sometimes there is also a general reference to 
'other language versions' without specification. 
58 Bobek (n 4) 138. 
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suggests that judges may refer to languages which are similar to their own: a 
Czech judge could, for instance, use the Slovak and Polish versions.59  
Derlén also gives examples of Danish, German and English courts referring 
to the English or French version60 as the original drafting languages. It is 
indeed common knowledge that English and French have a preeminent place 
in the legislative process in the EU.61 One of these languages is used to draft 
the original text and amendments, as well as in discussions between 
representatives of the EU institutions involved. The other language versions 
are in essence translations.62 The approach taken by some national judges is 
therefore understandable, although at variance with the guidelines of the ECJ 
which has, as far as could be ascertained, never referred to the drafting 
language. 
IV. POINTS OF CONCERN 
Clearly, a general point of concern in this context is quality control of EU 
legislation in all stages of its production. Indeed, it goes without saying that 
reducing (literal and conceptual) divergences would, to a large extent, prevent 
linguistic discrepancy problems. Suggestions include improving the quality of 
                                                 
59 Ibid 139. 
60 Derlén (n 5) 154.  
61 In 2013, English was the predominant drafting language (81%), against 4,5% for 
French and 2% for German. Historically, French was the main drafting language. In 
1997, French was still almost at the same level as English (Aleksandra Čavoški, 
'Interaction of law and language in the EU: Challenges of translating in multilingual 
environment' (2017) The Journal of Specialised Translation 62). 
62 Baaij (n 2) 12; Elena Ioriatti, Interpretazione comparante e multilinguismo Europeo 
(CEDAM, 2013) 66, 68; Manuela Guggeis, 'Multilingual legislation and the legal-
linguistic revision in the Council of the European Union' in Pozzo and Jacometti (n 
2) 114, 115. 
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drafting and translation,63 increasing harmonization of terminology,64 as well 
as making better use of IT-tools to detect language discrepancies.65 Although 
these are important remedies to explore, it remains to be seen, however, if it 
is possible to completely prevent all issues of discrepancies between versions 
of EU law, as was shown in Section II.1. Moreover, as this article focuses on 
the application and interpretation of EU law by national courts, the scope of 
the discussion will be limited here to flaws in that regard, namely the 
detection of language discrepancies and referral practices to the ECJ. In 
addition, the issue of legal certainty must be explored, given the fact that 
individuals may not place full trust in their own language version of EU law 
(see Section II.2). 
1. Detection of Language Discrepancies 
An important shortcoming in current interpretation practices in national 
courts is the possibility that language discrepancies remain unnoticed, which 
entails the risk of diverging case law in the Member States. Admittedly, the 
same risk exists to some extent also before the ECJ, but it is greater in 
(monolingual) national court procedures.  
In scholarship, it has been suggested that authentic status should be limited 
to one or more language versions66 or alternatively that English and French 
should be made 'mandatory consultation languages', which national judges 
would always have to consult as a default step when applying and interpreting 
EU law.67 Although such solutions would definitely increase the chances of 
detecting linguistic issues and may enhance coherence in case law, there are 
                                                 
63 Šarčević (n 3) 21-22. 
64 Ibid 23-24. See also Lucie Pacho Aljanati, Promoting Multilingual Consistency for the 
Quality of EU Law (2017) International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue 
Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 67-79. 
65 Sobotta (n 2) 85 et seq. 
66 See Schilling (n 3) 47. 
67 Derlén (n 2) 355-356; (n 4) 156 et seq. 
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also important legal and practical obstacles.68 Arguably, the line between 
reducing the number of authentic languages and imposing one or more 
mandatory consultation languages is rather thin. In my view, it appears 
questionable whether all languages could still be considered equally authentic 
when special reference status is granted to one or more of them. More 
substantially, the ECJ would still continue to perform a multilingual 
interpretation 'on a broad scale', possibly using other languages as well.69 
There would therefore be no guarantee of similar outcomes. In addition, on 
a more practical note, it seems doubtful whether all judges in all EU Member 
States currently have sufficient language skills to perform a mandatory 
consultation of one or more foreign languages as a default step when applying 
EU law. If this is not certain for English, it is even more doubtful for French. 
The number of Europeans knowing more than one foreign language is 
relatively small, and national judges are probably not an exception in that 
respect.70 Foreign language skills also vary greatly from one Member State to 
another.71 
In any event, it would seem that more research is needed into current 
practices of multilingual interpretation by judges in the Member States and 
into their language skills. The Dutch example seems to show in any case that 
English is the de facto reference language among Dutch judges when applying 
                                                 
68 As Sobotta argues, EU citizens cannot be expected to follow the law in another 
language than their own, as an expression of the principle of legal certainty. In 
addition, he invokes the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of language (art. 
21(1) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU) and asserts that multilingualism is 
partially a constitutional principle of the EU (art. 22 Charter). Moreover, he argues 
that making only one or a few languages authentic, would reduce the quality of other 
language versions (Sobotta (n 2) 82; see also Rideau (n 15) 69-70 and Šarčević (n 3) 20). 
69 Derlén (n 5) 157. 
70 The most widely spoken foreign languages in the EU are English (38%), French (12%) 
and German (11%). As far as could be ascertained there are no figures on linguistic 
skills of judges (but even among 'higher social classes' only about one third has a 
second foreign language) (European Commission, Europeans and their languages, 
Special Eurobarometer 386, 2012). 
71 Ibid. 
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and interpreting EU law. It would be important to have empirical data on the 
situation in all the Member States in that regard. Language training for 
national judges as well as for law students as part of their curriculum is in any 
case of the utmost importance.72 National judges must at the very least be able 
to assess whether their language version is in line with other language 
versions, otherwise they cannot apply and interpret EU law correctly. 
2. Referral to the ECJ 
As shown in Section III, there seems to be no clear and predictable use by the 
national courts (in the Member States for which data is available) of the ECJ 
preliminary ruling procedure in cases of linguistic discrepancies. This 
situation raises concerns as to the uniform application of EU law. Indeed, it 
seems doubtful that national courts, if they have detected a language 
discrepancy, are able to provide for an effective and adequate solution in all 
cases. Furthermore, the literal method (comparing language versions) is not 
easy to perform for national courts and will, in most cases, consist of a limited 
comparison, with English and maybe also French or German. Similarly, it is 
doubtful that a purposive interpretation approach, which incidentally does 
not seem to be the general method in national courts, could lead to similar 
outcomes in all the Member States, or, for that matter, in the ECJ. Another 
reason to resolve discrepancy issues on the EU level may be that problems are 
often not limited to only one language version, which requires interpretation 
by the ECJ. Accordingly, it seems preferable to always refer such issues to the 
ECJ.  
Such an approach is also in line with the CILFIT case law of the ECJ, entailing 
that courts and tribunals against whose decisions no legal remedies are 
                                                 
72 See Allan F. Tatham, 'The Impact of Training and Language Competence on Judicial 
Application of EU Law in Hungary' (2012) European Law Journal 577 et seq. See also 
European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2010 on civil law, commercial law, 
family law and private international law aspects of the Action Plan Implementing the 
Stockholm Programme, 2010/2080(INI), §I. See also Georg Kathrein, 
'Auslegungsprobleme bei verschiedenen Sprachfassungen', in Gerte Reichelt, Sprache 
und Recht (Ludwig Boltzmann 2006) 77-78.  
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available may abstain from referring questions to the ECJ only when there is 
no 'reasonable doubt' as regards the correct application of EU law. Whether 
or not there is a 'reasonable doubt' must be assessed 'in the light of the 
specific characteristics of Community law, the particular difficulties to which 
its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions 
within the Community'.73 Arguably, a 'reasonable doubt' about the correct 
interpretation and application of EU law exists in cases of a linguistic 
discrepancy, in particular at the conceptual level and, accordingly, such issues 
should be referred, as a general rule, to the ECJ. 
3. Legal Certainty  
EU multilingualism seems to create a paradox. While it is designed to 
enhance legal certainty so as to ensure that individuals may ascertain their 
rights and obligations under EU law in their own language, it also inevitably 
creates some degree of uncertainty as individuals cannot rely on their own 
language version alone. Arguably, the lack of full trust in one's own language 
version could be incompatible with the requirement that the consequences 
of legal provisions should be predictable and foreseeable to individuals. These 
are important aspects of the concept commonly known as legal certainty.74  
                                                 
73 ECJ, case 283/81 CILFIT EU:C:1982:335, para 21. 
74 Rechtssicherheit in German and as such also known in other continental legal systems. 
Some authors use the more general term 'rule of law' (Peczenik (n 11) 31). Other 
authors use the term 'legality' or the broad notion of 'lawfulness' in English (Leonard 
Besselink, Frans Pennings and Sacha Prechal, 'Introduction: Legality in Multiple 
Legal Orders' in Leonard Besselink, Frans Pennings and Sacha Prechal (eds), The 
Eclipse of the Legality Principle in the European Union (Wolters Kluwer 2011) 6-7). The 
term 'legality' is, however, also used to define legal certainty in criminal matters 
(Georg C. Langheld, 'Multilingual Norms in European Criminal Law' (2016) 
European criminal law review 47). As such, legal certainty is also considered to be an 
aspect of the rule of law (Ubaldus de Vries and Lyana Francot-Timmermans, 'As good 
as It Gets: On Risk, Legality and the Precautionary Principle' in Besselink et al (n 74) 
11) or a consequence thereof (Annika Suominen, 'What Role for Legal certainty in 
Criminal Law Within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the EU?' (2014) 2 
Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 7). The latter view is also shared 
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In order to fully grasp the challenge of multilingual interpretation with regard 
to legal certainty, it is essential to briefly explore in the following paragraphs 
some relevant aspects and scholarly views of this concept. Although legal 
certainty as such defies easy definition,75 it is generally accepted that its main 
purpose is to regulate the use of power by public authorities76 as an essential 
safeguard against arbitrary decisions with regard to individuals.77 As such, 
legal certainty establishes the primacy of statute law by the legislature and 
finds its origin in continental Europe in the French Revolution, where it was 
established in an effort to limit the law-making role of the courts.78  
The protection against arbitrariness may appear in both a formal and a 
substantive guise.79 As a formal principle, the accessibility of the norm is 
essential: laws should be public and accessible to all addressees. As a more 
substantive principle, foreseeability and predictability of the application and 
consequences of the norm are essential: laws must be clear and precise so as 
to enable individuals to ascertain the extent of their rights and obligations 
and foresee the legal consequences of their acts.80 Individuals must, in other 
                                                 
by the European Commission (Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council, A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule 
of Law (COM/2014/158), 11.3.2014). In its case law, the ECJ uses the term 'legal 
certainty'. That term will be used in this paper as well. 
75 Delphine Dero-Bugny, 'Les principes de sécurité juridique et de protection de la 
confiance légitime' in Jean-Bernard Auby and Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère (eds), 
Traité de droit administratif européen (Bruylant 2014) 653; Suominen (n 74) 1. 
76 Besselink et al (n 74) 6-7. 
77 Erik Claes, Wouter Devroe, Bert Keirsbilck (eds), Facing the Limits of the Law 
(Springer 2009) 107; Suominen (n 74) 6.  
78 Besselink et al (n 74) 5-6. 
79 Leen Keus, 'The Principle of Legal Certainty' in Arthur Hartkamp, Carla Sieburgh, 
Leen Keus, Jeroen Kortmann & Mark Wissink (eds), The influence of EU law on the 
National Private Law (Kluwer 2014) 297. 
80 Paunio sees this as a formal requirement, the substantive aspect being related to 
'acceptability' by the legal community (Paunio (n 3) 1469).  
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words, be able to rely on legislation: they have 'legitimate expectations' in 
that respect, which need to be protected by the courts.81  
In that regard it is settled case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) that the requirement of 'foreseeability' is fulfilled when a law is 
formulated with sufficient precision to enable any individual – if need be with 
appropriate advice – to regulate his or her conduct.82 The ECtHR performs a 
test of the quality of the legislation in that regard: a provision in national 
legislation should be phrased in clear terms, avoiding open and vague notions 
that may give the State authorities unfettered power and leave room for 
arbitrary interferences.83   
Though not explicitly enshrined in primary or secondary EU law,84 the ECJ 
has acknowledged 'legal certainty' as one of the fundamental general 
principles of EU law.85 According to the ECJ, legal certainty requires that 
rules imposing obligations on individuals have to be clear and precise, 
avoiding any ambiguity, and that their application should be predictable.86 
On the formal level of legal certainty requirements (accessibility of the law), 
the ECJ has consistently held, notably in its landmark Skoma-Lux judgment, 
that an EU regulation is not enforceable against individuals in an EU Member 
State if that regulation has not been officially published in the language of 
                                                 
81 Šarčević (n 3) 6; Suominen (n 74) 8. A distinction may be made between 'legal 
certainty' and the principle of legitimate expectations: the former is 'objective' the 
latter is 'subjective' (Dero-Bugny (n 75) 655). 
82 Eg ECtHR, cases 37331/97 Landvreugd, para 59; 67335/01 Achour, para 54 and 75909/01 
Sud Fondi, para 110. 
83 Aleidus Woltjer, 'The Quality of the Law as a Tool for Judicial Control' in Besselink 
et al (n 74) 102-105 and case law cited. 
84 Juha Raitio, The principle of legal certainty in EC law (Kluwer 2003) 125-266. 
85 Woltjer (n 83), 101. See, for instance, ECJ, cases C-231/15 Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji 
Elektronicznej EU:C:2016:769, para 29; C‑98/14 Berlington Hungary EU:C:2015:386, 
para 77; C‑201/08 Plantanol EU:C:2009:539, para 46.  
86 Woltjer (n 83) 99-101 and case law cited. 
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that Member State.87 This applies even if the individuals concerned were able 
to acquaint themselves by other means with the provisions of the regulation 
at issue. Although the ECJ has, however, not yet addressed the more 
substantive issue of legal certainty with regard to linguistic discrepancies in 
EU law, it has hinted at an incompatibility between legal certainty and the 
need for a uniform interpretation of diverging language versions, 'inasmuch 
as one or more of the texts involved may have to be interpreted in a manner 
at variance with the natural and usual meaning of the words'.88 
The tension between multilingual interpretation and legal certainty seems 
clear. The extent to which this tension raises concerns should be assessed, 
however, against the backdrop of the theory of indeterminate terms, 
according to which, in a nutshell, all (legal) terms are indefinite and vague and 
require interpretation.89 Moral acceptability of legal decisions is an 
important element: according to Peczenik, legal certainty in the material 
sense is 'the optimal compromise between predictability of legal decisions 
and their acceptability in view of other moral considerations'.90 
As to multilingual EU law, scholars influenced by this school of thought 
defend the view that the trust placed in the ECJ bypasses the problem of 
possible language discrepancies and leads to an acceptable and trusted 
solution for all language versions. As Van Meerbeeck asserts, there should be 
a shift from the Cartesian logic of absolute legal certainty, which he deems 
unrealistic, towards a 'fiduciary logic'.91 Likewise, Paunio suggests shifting 
the focus from clear and unequivocal rules to acceptability and judicial 
                                                 
87 ECJ, case C-161/06 Skoma-Lux EU:C:2007:773, paras 32 et seq; see also cases C-560/07 
Balbiino EU:C:2009:341, para 29 and C-146/11 Pimix EU:C:2012:450, paras 42 et seq. 
88 ECJ, case 80-76 North Kerry Milk Products EU:C:1977:39, para 11; see also case C-
340/08 The Queen, on the application of M and Others v Her Majesty's Treasury 
EU:C:2010:232, paras 64-65. 
89 For a discussion of these ideas in legal theory, see Brian H. Bix, 'Legal Interpretation 
and the Philosophy of Language' in Tiersma and Solan (n 2) 146-147. 
90 Peczenik (n 11) 32. 
91 Van Meerbeeck (n 3) 137, 139, 145. 
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reasoning.92 According to her, the predictable reasoning of the ECJ, on the 
basis of pre-established interpretative criteria and taking into account not 
only the purposes of the text but also the underlying aim of the legal system 
in general, offers adequate safeguards for legal certainty.93 Paunio is 
influenced by Habermas's 'theory of communicative action', according to 
which the law must be applied in a way that guarantees both certainty and 
rightness.94 As such, legal certainty is a principle that must be weighed and 
balanced against other interests and principles in the case at hand.95 She 
proposes the following formula for legal certainty: 'a predictable procedure 
plus a rationally acceptable and transparent legal reasoning in accordance 
with the underlying values of the legal community in question equals legal 
certainty'.96 
Others argue, by contrast, that terms in legislation should be interpreted 
according to 'word meaning' rather than 'speaker meaning'. Terms used by 
law makers should be interpreted according to the current best 
understanding of their 'real nature'.97 As to multilingual EU law, scholars that 
adopt the latter approach are inclined to consider discrepancies between 
language versions of EU law to be highly problematic. In that regard, Schilling 
asserts that the setting aside of the wording of a law and the general lack of 
detailed reasoning in doing so leaves the impression of a certain arbitrariness 
and is quite problematic under the aspect of foreseeability of legal 
consequences.98  
The core concepts in this debate seem to be legal reasoning and trust. While 
it is true, however, that arguments in favour of trust rather than clear and 
                                                 
92 Paunio (n 3) 2, 193; Elina Paunio and Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo, 'Taking 
Language Seriously: An Analysis of Linguistic Reasoning and Its Implications in EU 
Law' (2010) European Law Journal 395. 
93 Paunio (n 3) 194. See, in the same sense, Pacho (n 2) 112. 
94 Paunio (n 3) 1471-1472. 
95 Paunio (n 3) 1473.  
96 Paunio (n 3) 1492. 
97 Bix (n 89) 148. 
98 Schilling (n 3) 61. See also Derlén (n 2) 332 et seq; Ćapeta (n 31) 14. 
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unequivocal norms may be convincing to some extent as far as the ECJ is 
concerned, they are less strong with regard to national courts. Some critical 
observations must be made in that regard. 
First, as was shown in Section II, the ECJ applies a literal interpretation 
method in a majority of cases where linguistic discrepancies occur. As a 
general rule, national courts seem to take the same approach (at least in the 
Member States where data are available). Even when using a purposive or 
systematic interpretation, judges do not usually do so without any 
consideration for the wording of the law, which remains therefore of the 
utmost importance. Incidentally, national legal culture may also be relevant 
in that regard. Traditionally, common law English courts are, for instance, 
used to examining the words of legislation in meticulous detail, whereas in 
(some) civil law systems, courts have more freedom in interpreting it.99 Judges 
in certain Member States may therefore feel uncomfortable interpreting EU 
law on the basis of metalinguistic arguments in a way that contradicts the 
wording in their own language version. The survey of Dutch case law (Section 
III) seems in any case to suggest that, in current practice, judges use a literal 
approach to deal with language discrepancies, comparing the Dutch version 
with English (and additionally, with German and/or French). 
Second, the arguments of scholars influenced by indeterminacy theorists 
regarding 'acceptance' and 'trust' of the judicial decision-making process do 
not entirely convince in the context of national judicial decisions. Indeed, as 
it may be assumed that linguistic resources are more limited in national courts 
than at the ECJ, the risk of arbitrary decisions based on diverging EU law 
versions is greater. In any event, it is unlikely that multilingual interpretation 
by national courts in different EU Member States leads in all cases to similar 
outcomes. Arguably, such a situation is likely to increase distrust in national 
courts and EU law in circumstances where one's own language version is set 
aside. A concrete example may illustrate this point more clearly. In 2005, the 
Dutch stockbreeder Dirk Endendijk was prosecuted in the Netherlands 
                                                 
99 Silvia Ferreri, 'Multilingual Interpretation of European Union Law' (2015) CDCT 
Working Paper, <http://www.cdct.it/workingpapers> (accessed 20 June 2018) 14. 
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because he had tethered calves contrary to Dutch legislation adopted on the 
basis of an EU directive.100 Endendijk argued in his defence that the Dutch 
language version of the annex to the directive referred to a metallic tether, 
using the word 'chains' (kettingen) several times, whereas he had used a rope 
for tethering. The Dutch judge referred a preliminary question in that respect 
to the ECJ.101 The latter Court, however, dismissed the linguistic 
argument,102 citing its settled case law as explained above, according to which 
the word in question could not be examined solely in the Dutch version. It 
pointed out that other language versions, such as the German 
(Anbindevorrichtung), the English (tether), the French (attache) and the Italian 
(attacco), referred to a more general term. The ECJ concluded therefore that 
the word 'chains' used in the Dutch version was contrary to the objective 
pursued by the EU legislature: a calf is tethered where it is tied by a rope, 
irrespective of the material, length and purpose of that rope. Accordingly, 
Endendijk had committed a punishable act.  
Although rationally fully acceptable at the EU level – the Dutch version was 
clearly the diverging one, a textual language comparison and purposive 
interpretation brought out the true meaning of the norm – this judgment 
                                                 
100 The applicable text was Council Directive 91/629/EEC of 19 November 1991 laying 
down minimum standards for the protection of calves, OJ L 340/28. The ECJ handed 
down its judgment on 3 April 2008. The Directive was later codified (Council 
Directive 2008/119/EC of 18 December 2008 laying down minimum standards for the 
protection of calves, OJ L 10/7). The Dutch version was rectified in 2015 (OJ L 10/46) 
removing the linguistic discrepancy (as established by the ECJ in its judgment). 
101 ECJ, case C-187/07 Endendijk EU:C:2008:197. See also case 238/84 Röser EU:C:1986:88 
(para 22), where the ECJ concedes that the German version of a given provision 
(which is enforced by criminal law) is 'unclear' and 'open to another interpretation', 
yet states that the correct interpretation 'is apparent from a comparative 
examination of the different language versions, and in particular of the English, 
French and Italian versions, in which there is no ambiguity'. See also ECJ, case 250/80 
Schumacher EU:C:1981:246.  
102 The Court dismissed the claim also on the grounds that the exception at issue applied 
only to group-housed calves at the time of feeding milk. That was not the case with 
Endendijk's calves, which were penned in individual boxes. 
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seems to raise questions about the acceptability of the decision on the 
national level, not least by the individual concerned. Indeed, particularly 
when one's own language version is clear and unambiguous and there are no 
apparent reasons to have doubts about it, there seems to be an issue of legal 
certainty. The question may indeed be raised whether it is reasonable, from 
the perspective of democratic legitimacy, to expect that the addressee of the 
law should make the effort of consulting other language versions than their 
own (authentic) version.103 Furthermore, on a practical note, this obligation 
presupposes linguistic proficiency in one or more foreign languages, which is 
far from being general.104  
Another important issue relates to the sphere of criminal law. In the case of 
Endendijk, national provisions which were adopted in the application of EU 
law were enforced through criminal sanctions.105 In this regard the 
fundamental principle of legality, which is neatly encapsulated in the famous 
Latin maxim nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege ('no crime without law, 
no punishment without law'), comes into play. This principle, which is 
intertwined with the concept of legal certainty,106 is enshrined in article 11(2) 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights107 and in article 7 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms,108 as well as in article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU.109 Already established by Hobbes, who wrote that 'no law made after 
a fact done can make it a crime',110 this human right entails that the law should 
                                                 
103 Sobotta (n 2) 82. See, in the same sense, Rideau (n 15) 69-70 and Šarčević (n 3) 20. 
104 See Section IV.1, in particular n 70. 
105 See for the scope of EU criminal law: Suominen (n 74) 2-6; Burkhard Jähnke and 
Edward Schramm, Europäisches Strafrecht (De Gruyter 2017) 4. 
106 Suominen (n 74) 8-9. 
107 10 December 1948, 183th Plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, General 
Assembly Resolutions, 3rd Session (1948-1949), A/RES/217(III), 71. 
108 4 November 1950, European Treaty Series No 005. 
109 7 December 2000, OJ C 202/389 of 7.6.2016. 
110 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1965, first edition 1651) 226.  
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make the scope of a criminal offence as precise as possible (lex certa):111 
individuals must be able to know from the wording of the provisions of the 
law, if need be with the assistance of the courts' interpretation, what acts and 
omissions will make them criminally liable.112 The use of vague or ambiguous 
terms is, in other words, precluded. 
Moreover, the principle of legality encompasses the rule of leniency.113 In 
doubt, vague or ambiguous provisions are to be interpreted in favour of the 
defendant, a principle which is encapsulated in the Latin maxim in dubio pro 
reo ('when in doubt, for the accused').114 It could therefore be argued that, in 
the area of criminal law, individuals should be granted the benefit of the 
doubt when their own language version diverges from the others.115 At 
present, there is no case law of the ECtHR on the issue of multilingual norms 
and criminal liability. It therefore remains to be seen how it would rule in a 
case such as Endendijk and whether it would take issue with the fact that other 
languages must be consulted to determine the scope of criminal liability 
(possibly setting aside the wording of an individual's own language version). 
                                                 
111 Claes et al (n 77), 92; Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law volume I 
Sources, Subjects and Contents (Martinus Nijhoff 2008) 73 et seq. 
112 ECtHR, case 10249/03 Scoppola, paras 93-94. An 'inevitable element of judicial 
interpretation' is acceptable 'provided that the resultant development is consistent 
with the essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen' (ECtHR, cases 
34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98 Streletz, Kessler and Krenz, para 50). 
113 Cherif Bassiouni (n 111) 73.  
114 A. Ornowska, 'Introducing Hermeneutic Methods in Criminal Law Interpretation 
in Europe' in Joanna Jemielniak and Przemyslaw Mikłaszewicz (eds), Interpretation of 
law in the Global World: From Particularism to a Universal Approach (Springer 2010) 254. 
115 See, in the same sense, Langheld (n 74) 52. 
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V. HOW TO ENHANCE THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS IN CASE OF 
LINGUISTIC DIVERGENCES? 
1. In the Field of EU Criminal Law: Unenforceability of the Divergent Norm? 
As Van Meerbeeck aptly observes, 'legal certainty should operate mainly for 
the benefit of the individual and not for the powers that be, namely the EU'.116 
Indeed, it seems anything but fair that a citizen such as Endendijk has to bear 
the negative consequences of a legal provision which was unclear in his own 
language. Incidentally, the ECJ reasoned along these lines in its Skoma-Lux 
judgment on the issue of formal legal certainty (the accessibility of the norm). 
It held that an approach allowing an act which had not been properly 
published to be enforceable would result in individuals 'bearing the adverse 
effects' of a failure by the EU administration.117  
Could the case law in Skoma-Lux be applied to cases regarding substantial 
issues of legal certainty, so as to render a diverging language version 
unenforceable against individuals? Arguably, the circumstances in which a 
language version is not officially published, on the one hand, and those in 
which a language version diverges substantially, on the other, lead in the 
current state of affairs to quite different legal outcomes. The Czech 
enterprise Skoma-Lux could successfully argue that it did not have to follow 
EU provisions in the Czech Republic because they were not published in the 
Czech language. This held true irrespective of the fact that the Czech 
language version was made available by the Czech authorities in electronic 
form as well as in customs offices. It was also irrelevant whether Skoma-Lux, 
which had been operating for a long time in the field of international trade, 
knew the relevant provisions. By clear contrast, the Dutch stockbreeder 
                                                 
116 Van Meerbeeck (n 3) 138. 
117 ECJ, case C-161/06 Skoma-Lux EU:C:2007:773, para 42. See also ECJ case law on legal 
certainty and legitimate expectations, e.g. ECJ, cases C-1/02 Borgmann 
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Endendijk was unsuccessful despite arguing that he had followed to the letter 
the obligations laid down in the Dutch language version of the annex to the 
directive, as he should have consulted other language versions.  
On the other hand, however, unenforceability of a diverging language version 
could severely jeopardize the uniform application of EU law in all the 
Member States. Arguably, it could make matters worse, as it would open a 
Pandora's Box of arguments for lawyers to challenge a given language version, 
in line with current linguistic strategies in litigation.118 Therefore, such 
unenforceability should be limited, first and foremost, to the spheres of EU 
criminal law, to safeguard the legality principle.119 Second, there should be an 
appropriate yardstick to determine whether a language discrepancy is such 
that it might render a given legal provision unenforceable. As was explained 
in Section II.1, various categories of linguistic discrepancies may be 
discerned. Clear editing mistakes in a certain language version, which are easy 
to detect by the persons concerned and which do not as such affect 
understandability of the provision at issue would remain enforceable.120 Such 
circumstances would need to be assessed by national courts, using essentially 
the same criteria as for purely national criminal law.  
Another question in that regard is whether national courts should base their 
decision solely on their own local official language or should also take into 
account the mother tongue of the accused. Derlén gives an example of a case 
concerning German citizens in Denmark, where the Danish judge held that 
the defendants had not been aware of the meaning in the Danish language 
version but had presumed the (diverging) German version to be correct. 
Therefore, no intentional infringement was established and the defendants 
were acquitted.121 As a general rule though, it would seem that judges should 
                                                 
118 See Section III. 
119 See Section IV.3. 
120 Eg ECJ, case C-558/11 Kurcums Metal EU:C:2012:721. This case concerned an omission 
in the Latvian language version which the Court considered to be 'clearly an editing 
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121 Derlén (n 2) 335-336. 
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apply their own official language version. This is in line with the Skoma-Lux 
judgement, in which the ECJ held that regulations are enforceable against 
individuals only when published in the language of that Member State 
(although the issue was less complicated as the case concerned a Czech 
company in the Czech Republic). At any rate, in the current state of affairs, 
such unenforceability of a diverging language version would require 
legislative action or framing of a doctrine in that sense by the ECJ.  
2. A More Convenient Solution: Taking into Account Language Divergences as 
'Mitigating Circumstances' 
There is a less radical alternative to unenforceability of the norm at issue: in 
their assessment of the case, national courts could take into account the fact 
that a given individual based his or her actions on a diverging language version 
and attenuate the adverse effects. As with unenforceability, an appropriate 
yardstick would have to be applied, by which national courts could determine 
whether the discrepancy affected correct understandability of the provision 
at issue.122 Interestingly, that approach was eventually taken by the Dutch 
court in the Endendijk case. After the judgment in which the ECJ ruled that a 
'chain' could also be a 'rope', the Dutch court had no choice but to establish 
that Endendijk had indeed committed a punishable act. Yet, as a mitigating 
circumstance, it took into account the fact that Endendijk's contribution had 
'clarified the scope of EU rules' and did not impose a penalty.123 Arguably, the 
scope of such a lenient approach could be broader than the sphere of criminal 
law. It could be applied in all cases of a diverging language version of EU law 
entailing adverse effects for individuals (such as tax liabilities, administrative 
sanctions, increased obligations or decreased rights, etc.), but exclusively in 
cases where the ECJ has established such a discrepancy. 
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The question may be raised in that regard whether such 'leniency' would be 
in line with ECJ case law as it stands. The following example may illustrate 
this. The Gerechtshof Amsterdam held, in a tax law case, that it cannot be 
expected that a taxable person checks customs regulations in languages other 
than Dutch.124 On appeal in 'cassation', the Hoge Raad (Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands) referred the issue to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. The ECJ 
reiterated its standing case law and held that, although the Dutch version of 
the wording of the customs provision at issue, 'unlike a number of other 
language versions', did indeed not expressly specify the goods in question, 
other language versions did.125 The ECJ thus gave a general and abstract 
interpretation of the EU law provision at issue for the sake of uniformity. Its 
judgment is limited, however, to the question that was submitted by the 
national court. It does not rule on other aspects of the case. Therefore, it may 
be argued that national courts still have the possibility to take into account 
the fact that the individual acted in good faith and was not able to foresee the 
consequences of his or her actions on the basis of a diverging own language 
version. In their rulings, national courts could therefore, in my view, 
endeavour to limit any adverse effects for the individual concerned while at 
the same time respecting the binding ECJ interpretation.   
National courts may, however, appreciate some encouragement from the 
ECJ in that sense. The ECJ could expressly leave national courts a sufficient 
margin of appreciation to make an exception in the specific case at issue. 
Judges would then feel reassured by the ECJ that, in circumstances where a 
language version is held by the ECJ to be diverging and not correctly 
establishing the meaning of a given provision, there should be (as far as 
possible) no liability of the person concerned or other adverse effects. This 
may fall on fertile ground, as national courts may in any case be reluctant to 
enforce ECJ rulings against individuals acting in good faith on the basis of 
their own language version. 
                                                 
124 Gerechtshof Amsterdam, case 01/90096 DK X. B.V., NL:GHAMS:2004:AR7276, 
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2018} How to Deal with Diverging Language Versions? 37 
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In Thomas More's Utopia, laws are drafted using plain and unequivocal words 
so as to make sure that all citizens understand them, for 'it is all one, not to 
make a law at all, or to couch it in such terms that without a quick 
apprehension, and much study, a man cannot find out the true meaning of 
it'.126 Difficult enough to accomplish in culturally and linguistically 
homogeneous societies, the achievement of this ideal in a multilingual and 
pluralistic legal order such as the EU is akin to the quest for the Holy Grail. 
Utopia did not take into account the emergence of a legal order in which laws 
are equally authentic in 24 languages which furthermore have to be 
interpreted and applied in a uniform manner in 28 Member States with 
different legal traditions. 
The magnitude of this achievement cannot be underestimated. Great merit 
is due in that regard to the case law of the ECJ which has for more than half a 
century eliminated language discrepancies in EU law by means of a purposive 
and systematic interpretation, taking into account various language versions. 
As is rightly asserted in legal scholarship, trust in the ECJ and its legal 
reasoning to provide a uniform interpretation of diverging language versions 
is essential. Yet the situation may be quite different when national courts 
apply and interpret EU law. Research in the Netherlands suggests that they 
do so essentially on the basis of their own language version alone. When they 
have reasons to doubt that version, they do not automatically refer questions 
to the ECJ but try to resolve the issue by consulting, as a general rule, the 
English version (if possible also German and/or French).   
Current practice seems to present some methodological flaws. First, it 
cannot be excluded that language discrepancies remain unnoticed. Language 
comparison should be a default step in the interpretation and application of 
EU law. Second, if a language discrepancy is detected, questions should be 
referred to the ECJ. Moreover, the limits of multilingual interpretation with 
regard to the concept of Rechtssicherheit (legal certainty) have remained largely 
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undefined. This multilingualism paradox, where individuals have a right to 
their own language version, on the one hand, but cannot trust it entirely as 
they may not rely solely on it, on the other, remains unsolved. Trust in the 
ECJ and its legal reasoning may to some extent resolve this issue, as is in 
particular argued by 'indeterminate terms' theorists, who consider in essence 
that all legal norms are in any case indefinite and that full foreseeability of 
interpretation by courts of any given rule is an illusion. However, this theory, 
in my view, is not entirely convincing, in particular with regard to the 
application and interpretation of EU law by national courts. Indeed, in 
current practice, it is unlikely that multilingual interpretation by national 
courts in different EU Member States leads in all cases to similar outcomes. 
Arguably, such a situation is likely to increase distrust in national courts and 
EU law, not least in circumstances where the wording of one's own language 
version is set aside. This issue is of particular relevance with regard to the 
legality principle in the spheres of EU criminal law. 
In that regard, the right of individuals to place trust in their own language 
version of EU law should be better protected than is currently the case. A 
radical approach would be, in criminal law, to hold a (seriously) diverging 
language version unenforceable against individuals, just as is the case when a 
language version is not published. There is, however, a more convenient and 
less radical alternative, which would consist of allowing national courts in 
concreto, in the individual case at issue before them, to show leniency and take 
into account that the individuals concerned acted in good faith on the basis 
of their own language version. Accordingly, no sanction would be imposed in 
criminal law and in other cases the adverse effects of a diverging language 
version would be alleviated as much as possible. This would not require a 
change in the current case law of the ECJ which would continue to provide a 
uniform interpretation in abstracto. The ECJ could, however, expressly leave 
national courts a margin of appreciation to encourage them to find adequate 
solutions in concreto to avoid adverse consequences for individuals who base 
their actions in good faith on a diverging language version. 
